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ABSTRACT 
Cognitive radio represents a promising paradigm to further 
increase transmission rates in wireless networks, as well as to 
facilitate the deployment of self-organized networks such as 
femtocells. Within this framework, secondary users (SU) may 
exploit the channel under the premise to maintain the quality 
of service (QoS) on primary users (PU) above a certain level. 
To achieve this goal, we present a noncooperative game where 
SU maximize their transmission rates, and may act as well as 
relays of the PU in order to hold their perceived QoS above 
the given threshold. In the paper, we analyze the properties 
of the game within the theory of variational inequalities, and 
provide an algorithm that converges to one Nash Equilibrium 
of the game. Finally, we present some simulations and com-
pare the algorithm with another method that does not consider 
SU acting as relays. 
Index Terms— Cognitive radio, variational inequalities, 
game theory, self-organized networks, small cells 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Encouraged by an increasing demand, wireless data services 
have experienced a tremendous growth in the past years, and 
more is expected to come due to a greater proliferation of 
user terminals, transmission requirements, and ubiquitous 
services. For these reasons, self-organized networks that 
adapt and configure themselves in a changing environment 
constitute a desirable deployment strategy for operators to in-
crease transmission rates and coverage, while reducing their 
installation and maintenance costs. 
The cognitive radio (CR) paradigm intends to combine 
the present deployed networks with the future self-organized 
networks, by establishing a hierarchy on the data services 
offered to licensed and unlicensed users. While the macro-
cell networks are set to provide sufficient quality of service 
(QoS) to the licensed or primary users (PU), the unlicensed 
or secondary users (SU) may exploit the underused chan-
nels without disturbing the PU transmissions. This requires 
some knowledge of the transmitting channels, specially some 
measure or estimation of the interference caused to the PU 
(or QoS perceived), in order to maintain the service unobtru-
sively. Several techniques for the SU have been proposed to 
accomplish this, namely interweaving, underlay and overlay 
transmissions [1, 2, 3], which we introduce next. 
The interweaving technique consists on the SU sensing 
the spectrum holes in the different subchannels, and avoid 
causing any interference to the PU. The main difficulty of this 
scheme resides in sensing these gaps accurately, and in pre-
dicting the next PU transmission slots. Therefore, it becomes 
difficult to implement in highly dynamic environments, where 
the SU communications pair would require to be very precise 
and agile in switching channels. 
On the other hand, in the underlay scheme the SU trans-
mit in the same bands as the PU while satisfying some QoS 
constraints. This scheme is also transparent to the PU, which 
just regards the interference as additive noise without affect-
ing communication. However, it has the difficulty for SU to 
work in low SNR regimes and very short range communi-
cations, in order to keep the interference temperature on PU 
under given thresholds. 
Finally, the overlay scheme presents itself as a general-
ization of the underlay scheme, where SU act as relays for the 
PU communication (increasing their SINR), and are therefore 
allowed to further augment the interference level caused to 
these PU. The technique comes however at the cost of greater 
integration among SU and PU, at least in order for the PU to 
decode the relayed message. See [1] for techniques to accom-
plish this. Similar approaches were also proposed in [4, 5], 
where the PU leased their own spectrum in exchange for the 
helping relays. 
Within the overlay paradigm, we present a monotone 
game played among SU that maximize the achievable in-
formation rate, while satisfying some QoS constraint on the 
PU, and where the SU forward information dynamically act-
ing as relays. We study the existence of Nash Equilibrium 
(NE) solutions, and provide an algorithm that converges to 
one of these equilibriums. Our contributions on this paper 
are mainly the generalization of previously studied underlay 
techniques to the overlay scheme, and showing the capacity 
gains when comparing both techniques. 
Regarding previous work, we build upon the ideas intro-
duced in [2] which proposed a potential game among SU for 
both underlay and overlay schemes. In their approach, au-
thors introduce a performance function for each player that 
minimizes interference, but without explicitly regarding the 
maximization of a capacity formula. Additionally, the inter-
ference levels reached at the PU are not constrained below a 
given level, but rather have to be found through simulation 
after specifying some weighting parameters. To address this 
matter, in our approach we explicitly impose feasibility con-
straints, and maximize capacity on the available subcarriers. 
We also base our work in the framework presented in [6] 
and previously developed through different publications ap-
plied to CR scenarios [7, 8, 9], which expand the analysis 
tools to study monotone games through variational inequali-
ties (VI). In our presentation, we adapt our problem formula-
tion to this theory, and analyze its convergence. Furthermore, 
we compare our simulation results with the algorithm pre-
sented in [6] as the SISO case (underlay paradigm), showing 
the achievable performance gain in high-interference scenar-
ios, when adopting an overlay transmission scheme. 
Finally, other recent related work is the one proposed 
in [10] where authors present a reinforcement learning al-
gorithm to solve an altruistic game (team game) and a com-
petitive game. Here, the learning process can rely on a 
formulation with full channel knowledge (all players know 
all strategies and channel state), or with limited knowledge 
(players only have access to their utility function). In our 
algorithm (as well as in [6, 7, 8]), only local information is 
required, as well as some collaboration from PU indicating 
how saturated the interference constraints are. 
In Section 2 we introduce the system model, the game for-
mulation for SU, and formulate the equivalence to VI. Then, 
within the VI theory we analyze the existence of solutions and 
properties. In Section 3 we reformulate the objective func-
tions, and describe an algorithm to find a solution of the game. 
Finally, on Sections 4 and 5 we present some simulations and 
the conclusions. During the exposition of the problem we 
will assume some knowledge of VI and game theory. As def-
initions of NE, VI solutions, monotonicity of VI and games, 
P-matrix properties, and uniformly P-functions, we have used 
the ones presented in [6]. 
2. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM 
FORMULATION 
We present here a CR system with P primary users and Q sec-
ondary users (players), who transmit in jV-parallel Gaussian 
interference channels. Each SU represents a transmitting pair 
who tries to maximize their achievable data rate, while PU 
have assigned transmission channels and QoS requirements. 
We denote here the channel (cross)transfer coefficients for SU 
as H^s(k) indicating that this is the (squared) channel gain 
from the j SU transmitter to the i SU receiver on subcarrier 
k, and we indicate H^s (k) for the transfer function from the 
j SU transmitter to the p PU receiver on subcarrier k. The SU 
transfer coefficient is therefore referred to as Hfis(k). The 
channel is AWGN and we express the noise variances with 
of (A;). Note that each noise term may include any undecod-
able signal of PU on SU, and this term wil l not vary during 
the resolution of the game since PU do not participate in the 
power allocation algorithm. 
The objective of the game is to find the corresponding 
power allocation scheme for each player, which engulfs both 
the power dedicated to the individual data, as well as the re-
layed transmission. We wil l refer to the former for user i as 
{Pi{k)}k=i, and we wil l indicate the later as {pf(^)}fc=i
 p=\, 
where every SU may relay the data of one, or several PU. 
Additionally, we wil l use the vector notation of the previous 
magnitudes as p¿ = (pi(k), (Pi(k))p=1)^=1, we wil l refer to 
the strategies from other users with p_¿ = {pj)f=í7^¿, and 
to the strategies of all users with p = (PÍ)Í=1. The achievable 
transmission rate is then given by the capacity formula, 
r¿(p¿ip-¿) = / , 1 ° § 1 + 
H?ib(k)Pi(k) 
> log H ñ, s v^ „ „ 
(1) 
with total power constraint J2/.(pi(k) + J2 p^(k)) < P¿max, 
and limiting values 0 < Pi(k),p¿(k) < pmax(k) for all i and 
p. In equivalent form the strategy set is 
Vi = Pi € K + |1 j < Pm Vi Si Pim a (2) 
where the SU transmission and relayed powers are implicitly 
included in p ¿. 
In order to satisfy the QoS on every PU, we define a min-
imum capacity threshold bp(k) on every subcarrier where a 
transmission takes place, given by 
log 1 + 
Gp{k) + ^ Q P S TT \nV3 
<jp(k) + $^fci Hpf (k)P (k)pj(k) 
> bp{k) (3) 
where Gp(k) represents the PU joint channel gain and power. 
We can find an equivalent expression by manipulating its 
terms, getting 
Q 
9pk(p) = /,Hpj ap(k)Pj(k) ~PIj(k)) ~ -fp(^) íí 0 (4) 
where ap(k) = ebp^k' — 1, and Ip(k) = Gp(k) — ap(k)ap. 
Equation (4) is linear, limits the total interference with a 
maximum temperature value Ip(k), and is coupled among all 
users. Adding these constraints to the feasible region yields: 
V = {PifiLi i~i {p I gp(p) < 0, Vp = 1 , . . . , P} (5) 
withgp(p) = (gpk{v))k=i. 
Now we can present the Generalized Nash Equilibrium 
Problem (GNEP) for all SU as Ggnep = (V, {ri)f=i 
r i ( P i i P - i ) 
s.t. p¿ G P(P-i 
max 
p i y i = i , . . . , Q. (6) 
The variational inequality (VI) associated to Qgnep wi l l 
allow us to analyze the properties of the game. Defining F¿ = 
V p Tj (p¿, p-¿), and F = (F¿)¡i=1 we can state the following, 
Lemma 1. (from [7]) Let the game Qg V,{i i ) i=i 
and let the variational inequality be defined as VI(P, F). 
Then, if(p*, A*) is a solution of the VI, so that 
0 G Fj(p*) + XL=i A*TV p ¿gp(p*) , p* € Vi, V» 
0 < A* _L g p (p*) < 0, Vp 
(7) 
it is also a solution of Qgnep. We will refer to these points as 
variational solutions of the game. 
Now, based on [7] we define matrices, T p and T 
In order to establish the existence of solutions for the V I , 
and consequently to the Qgnep, we need to proof monotonicity 
of the mapping F on V from the defined V I . We denote the 
Jacobian matrix as J F = (JP jFj(p))¿ = 1 , with J P j F j (p ) 
indicating the partial Jacobian matrix with respect to the SU’s 
vector p j . Then, using the developed framework to analyze 
the structure of VIs from [7], we introduce the following ma-
trix 
[ JF l o w ] j j = 
inf
 £p[JFl 
sup per I [JF]ij | 
i f i = j 
otherwise 
(8) 
which applied to our problem has the following structure, 
i f i = j and
 a Á 
dpi (k) 
[JFlow(k)]ij = 
TT O O / ? \ I 2 
r/ss in • innr¿,-(/:) if i = j and
 a Á 
H (k)\2 3 v or>j{k 
if dFi or 
dpj(k) 
dFi 
op-[k) opAk) 
Cj (^ )+X] r Hjr Pm axik) with innr¿j(A;)
 2(k\ 
ate the following properties: 
(9) 
We can now enunci-
Proposition 1. Given the game Qgnep and its associated 
VICP, F) the following holds 
1. Suppose matrix .fFlow(k) as given in (9) is positive 
semidefinite, then the VI is monotone, and Qgnep is a 
monotone GNEP. 
2. Because V is closed and compact, the VI and Qgnep have 
a nonempty and compact solution set (also convex if con-
dition 1 is satisfied). 
Proof. We can apply the theory of NEPs to our GNEP as 
stated in Lemmas 4.2, 4.3 in [7] because Assumption 4.3 [7] 
is satisfied. Indeed, we have a nonempty, closed and con-
vex subset P j for every i, the objective functions are twice 
continuously differentiable and concave, and gP(p) is jointly 
convex and continuously differentiable. Now, we can affirm 
condition 1 is guaranteed by Proposition 5 (a) in [6], and con-
dition 2 by Theorem 8 (a,b) [6]. D 
For the uniqueness of solution of the V I , matrix J F would 
be required to be a P-matrix. However, because the Jacobian 
is zero on variables p^(k), J F cannot satisfy the conditions, 
and the V I may have infinite NE. Nonetheless, we add a prox-
imal regularizer to analyze the P-properties of the mapping F, 
and this wi l l also be useful to guarantee convergence of Algo-
rithm 1. We consider then the modified VI(V, F + T ( I — y)) , 
where I is the indicator function, y = (yi)i=1, and y¿ = 
(Vi(k), (yf(k))p=1)k=1 is a fixed point so that y G V. Pointy 
limits the V I to a unique solution, and by updating its value 
to a closer NE of the original game as in Algorithm 1, it wi l l 
guarantee reaching such a solution. Note that y is instrumen-
tal into attaining a solution, but it doesn’t affect the existence 
of multiple NE on the original game (6). 
[f FJ¿J 
\£ PMí'-í = 
inf
 ep Aleast(Jp¿(fc)F¿(p)), i f i = j 
— S UPp£P || (•^p¿(fe)Fj (p)) ||, if i y^ j 
inf
 ep Aleast(Jpp(fc)F¿(p)), i f i = j 
suPpeplKJp?(fc)Fj(p) if * ¥" j 
(10) 
(11) 
where their definition differs in that the partial derivatives of 
the Jacobians are relative only to Pi(k), or to p%(k), respec-
tively. Note that the notation Aleast means smallest eigenvalue. 
The purpose behind these definitions is to determine sufficient 
conditions that would guarantee that the VI(V, F + T ( I — y)) 
is a P-function. Due to the Cartesian structure of the Jacobian 
matrix J F , we can affirm that if both matrices T p and T F 
are P-matrices, then so is the V I . 
As analyzed in [6], matrix T p has the form 
1 
| f FJ¿J 
maxfc ~ H^s(k) ' innr¿j(^) 
i f i = j 
i f i = j 
(12) 
and matrix T F = 0 since the Jacobian is zero on those terms. 
Adding a regularizer as intended, T p
 T = T p + T\1 is a 
P-matrix for 
T\ > 
J¥« 
max 
k (k) Hss 33 
innr¿j(A;) 
and matrix T P ^ 
(13) 
Tq\ is a P-matrix for TI > 0, where 
we have split T = (r¿)?=1 to analyze both matrices. We have 
used the operator [z\ = maxjz, 0}. 
Summing up, T\ as specified on equation (13) and T2 > 0 
give sufficient conditions for VI (P, F + T ( I — y)) to be a 
uniformly P-function, so that a unique solution exists on the 
modified V I for given y. 
3. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM 
We now reformulate the game Qgnep in a more convenient 
form with the feasible region having a Cartesian structure, 
so that we can use the decomposition algorithms for Nash 
Equilibrium Problems (NEPs) as in [6, 7]. We introduce the 
game G\(y) 
max 
p i 
s.t. 
r¿(P¿iP-¿) — 2~2n=l ^-p&piPii P -
í || p j — y¿ ||2 V» (14) 
Pi G Vi 
and furthermore require 
0 < Xp _L gp(p) < 0, Vp = 1,..., N (15) 
where the term J || p¿ — y¿ ||2 has been added to obtain a 
strongly convex optimization problem, where y¿ is another 
point in the feasibility region, and T has to be big enough to 
guarantee P-uniformity, as given in (13). 
This formulation allows for a distributed computation for 
every player for known coefficients Xp, since all variables and 
feasible sets are local. The parameters Xp can be interpreted 
as the price paid by the players for using the maximum al-
lowed interference, which due to equation (15) is nonzero 
only when the resources become scarce. 
To solve problem (14), the individual KKT conditions 
have to be satisfied, therefore 
Algorithm 1 Projection Algorithm 
g j f (fc) 
°
2{k)+ Y%=iHff{k)Pj{k) ~
 T l (Pi(k) — Vi(k)) 
— 5^p=i Xp(k)H^s(k) — /XJ = 0 
(16) 
~
T2 (pf(^) — yf) — / Xp(k)H ¿ (k) — Hi = 0 (17) 
p 
o < Hi _L y (pi(k) + y p^(k)) — p¿max < o (18) 
& p 
for every user i = 1 , . . . , Q. The parameter Hi is some water-
level that has to be determined to satisfy condition (18). 
The real positive root from (16) is given by 
pAk) = I IvAk) — + I 
[ . -, p max P>i(k) — \ Lbj(k)—Tl I Vi(k) + TT- ) 
(19) 
which is the same solution as equation (71) in the under-
lay game from [6], and where we have simplified the nota-
tion to Hk 
EPP=1 XP(k)Hl 
H°°{k) 
2 ^ Q „ssn77 and Hi(k) = Hi + 
i ( ^ )+ Z^3 = l -"¿3 Wpj{k) 
= i . ^ I p f (k) for our problem. The used operator is 
defined as [z]a = min{max{z, a}, b}. 
Likewise, relayed powers from (17) are given by 
Pi(k) = yf(k) + [ „ 1 Vi\k) H T 2 i 
P=Í 
Xp(k)H ¿ (k) — Hi 
(20) 
Based on the Projection Algorithm with variable steps 
from [7], we can formulate Algorithm 1 that determines the 
best response in variables {pi(k),{p^(k)}p}k for all SU. 
Note that on step 2 values y^ and Xpn are held fixed for the 
resolution of inner game Q\M (y^) (as given in (14)), and 
are later updated for subsequent iterations. Algorithm 2 is 
an inner loop of the main algorithm that solves Q\M (y^), 
whose structure is based on a bisection algorithm presented 
in [6], and considers the relayed powers towards PU. This al-
gorithm has the novelty of detecting saturated PU constraints, 
and balancing the available powers both on maximizing user 
capacity, and helping to lower the cost of interfering PU. 
4. SIMULATIONS 
For the simulations we have created a scenario of Q = 10 
SU, P = 2 PU and N = 64 subcarriers. The transfer func-
tion for an OFDM channel is determined by a FIR filter of 
1. Set n <— 0 
» pÁn) in) Initialize variables y\ (k),yf (k), Xp (k), \/i,p, k. 
2. I f stopping criteria is satisfied, stop 
3. Determine best response of variables Pi(k), p?(k) \/k,i 
using Alg. 2, with fixed values Xpn , y\n [k), y\' n (k). 
4. Update interference prices 
A (n+l) (») Xp + «ngp(p) Vp = 1, . . . , P 
5. Set n <— n+l; 
Update y\f \k) <—pi(k),y^n(k) ^p^(k) 
Go to step 2. 
Algorithm 2 Power allocation for Overlay Wireless Network 
1. Choose accuracy level e. 
2. Set H = 0, and 
Hi = 
PS(k))}} maxfc (Hk + T~iyi(k) — ^ Ap(A;)iíÍ¿ 
3. Set Hi = in- ~^Hi)/2 
4. Using (19) and (20) determine pn (k) and p^(k) \/k,p 
5. I f Efc(pi(&) + ~^2pPi(k)) < -Pjmax, then/Ij = Hi 
otherwise, u = u¿. 
—i 
6. I f IL — u > e, go to step 3, otherwise stop. 
length L and exponential power profile, with randomly cho-
sen complex Gaussian coefficients which are then normal-
ized, and where the subcarrier coefficients are determined by 
the squared samples of the FFT of order N. As simulation 
parameters, we have chosen a level of total power transmis-
sion of 10mW, interference peak level Ip(k) = 0.8 mW, and 
the joint channel and power gain of PU to Gp(k) = 2mW. 
A l l channel noises have been set to 1mW. For the SU to 
SU channel gain the SNR = E {P4max i i |p(A;)/of(A;)} = 
5 dB, and for cross-channel gains among different SU INR = 
E j p m a x ^ s s ^ - j ^ ^ ^ - j j _ o dB. Finally step size a n = 0.1, 
T I has been chosen to satisfy equation (13), and T2 = 1. In the 
following figures we have simulated our algorithm which we 
refer to as “overlay”, and the SISO algorithm from [6], which 
we refer to as “underlay”. 
In Figure 1 we have represented the convergence speed 
given the previously mentioned simulation parameters, and 
additionally considering a channel gain from SU to PU of 
0 dB for all the cases. We observe that the total sum rate oscil-
lates until it stabilizes, due to temporal violation of the given 
constraints on the interference caused to PU. Note, that both 
schemes show this behavior, and have similar convergence 
speed for the simulated channels. 
In Figure 2 we represent the total sum-rate of SU as a 
function of the increasing channel gain caused from SU to 
PU. We observe that on lower levels of interference the over-
lay and underlay algorithms converge to the same sum-rate, 
but as the interference channel gain increases, the underlay 
algorithm saturates on a lower sum-rate level so that it does 
not violate the given constraints. On the other hand, with the 
overlay scheme, the unused power can be employed on relay-
ing the PU information, and can therefore increase the trans-
mitted information rate. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a monotone GNEP which 
maximizes the SU transmission rates, while holding the ca-
pacity level of PU above a given value. This was accom-
plished using an overlay scheme, where SU may retransmit 
the PU information as a trade-off to increase the interference 
level caused. We have analyzed the game through the theory 
of VI, and provided a convergent algorithm that allocates the 
transmission powers of SU data, as well as the power used 
to relay PU information. With our algorithm, we can analyze 
the achievable gain for SU when cooperating with PU at the 
expense of more integration. 
As future work, NE selection could be implemented and 
analyzed in the algorithm. Additionally, more realistic infor-
mation could be incorporated to the model, such as SINR re-
quirements on SU to be able to decode and retransmit the PU 
data, as well as a more advanced structure of relaying network 
among SU. 
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